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  The question of the effectiveness of monetary policy is a long-standing issue in 
the literature of monetary economics and central banking.  Perspectives on the question 
have been influenced, in part, by developments in monetary theory, in part by 
interpretations of monetary history.  Progress in the discussion has also been influenced, 
indeed some might say hindered, by changing definitions of both “monetary policy” and 
“effectiveness.”  Our discussion will address 1) changing views of the role and 
effectiveness of monetary policy, 2) inflation targeting as an “effective monetary policy,” 
3) monetary policy and short-run (output) stabilization, and 4) problems in implementing 
a short-run stabilization policy. 
1. Changing Views on the Role and Effectiveness of Monetary Policy. 
  What do analysts mean by “monetary policy” and the “effectiveness” thereof?  
Both terms are something of moving targets.  At times “monetary policy” has referred to 
central bank actions to influence and/or target some measure of the money stock.  
Frequently, though certainly not always, the definition of monetary policy focused on a 
measure of “high powered money” – liabilities of the central bank.  For a long time, this 
was the definition incorporated in theoretical models.  In the policy arena this 
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  2definition was the foundation of the “monetarist revolution” in the 1960s and 70s.  A 
counter definition that was likely the dominant perspective of policymakers was that 
monetary policy referred to central bank actions to influence and/or target short-term 
interest rates or nominal exchange rates.  Sargent and Wallace (1975) advanced the 
proposition that, in a model with “rational expectations,” the price level (and all other 
nominal variables) could be indeterminate if central banks set targets for nominal interest 
rates, because the economy would lack a “nominal anchor.”  McCallum (1981) showed 
that an appropriately defined interest rate rule would avoid such indeterminacy.  The 
interest rate rule had to include a “nominal anchor.”  In recent years, in particular since 
Taylor’s (1993) proposed characterization of  FOMC behavior in the early Greenspan 
years, interest rate rules that include a “nominal anchor” in the form of a desired or target 
inflation rate, have become the basic specification of  “monetary policy” in theoretical 
analyses [see for example, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999)]. 
  The legacy of the Great Depression in the United States and other industrialized 
economies was that monetary policy was “ineffective.”  This perspective is most 
prominent in Keynes’ General Theory and in the writings of the “Keynesian economists” 
in the 1940s through the 1960s. For example, the Radcliffe Committee in the United 
Kingdom reported: 
 The immediate object of monetary policy action is to affect the level of 
total demand. … In theory, monetary action may work upon total demand 
by changing the interest incentive; we believe that only very limited 
reliance can be placed on this.  More certainly, monetary action works 
upon total demand by altering the liquidity position of financial 
institutions and of firms and people desiring to spend on real resources; 
the supply of money itself is not the critical factor.
1
 
                                                 
1 Committee on the Workings of the Monetary System: Report, p. 135 
  3In the United States the minimalist perspective on the role and effectiveness of monetary 
policy can be seen in the first two Reports of the Kennedy Council of Economic 
Advisers: 
Unless the Government acts to make compensating changes in the 
monetary base, expansion of general economic activity, accompanied by 
increased demands for liquid balances and for investment funds will tend 
to tighten interest rates and restrict the availability of credit.   … 
Discretionary policy is essential, sometimes to reinforce, sometimes to 
mitigate or overcome, the monetary consequences of short-run 
fluctuations of economic activity.  In addition, discretionary policy must 
provide the base for expanding liquidity and credit in line with the 





Monetary policy as well as debt management policy must be coordinated 
with fiscal policy to secure the objectives of high employment and growth 
without inflation.  We are, and for some time still will be, in a situation of 
substantial slack in labor force and capital resources, a situation in which 
expansionary policies are required. … What matters most at this time is 
that financial policy should be designed to facilitate rather than retard the 
expansionary process which the tax program is designed to launch.
3
 
  A decade later, perspectives on the effectiveness of monetary policy had changed;  
and, in some circles, monetary policy was viewed as equally important as fiscal policy for 
affecting both inflation and output fluctuations: 
The past 10 years have been characterized by an average growth rate of 
aggregate expenditures that is very high by historical standards and that 
has substantially outstripped the sustainable growth of supply of real 
goods and services.  Contributing significantly to the growth of aggregate 
demand were rapidly increasing Government expenditures along with 
monetary policies that were appreciably more expansionary than those in 
earlier post-World War II periods. … 
 
When the inflationary phase has lasted so long that expectations of further 
inflation are firmly embedded in the cost trend, a shift to policies of 
restraint first exerts an adverse influence on output and the desired price 
                                                 
2 Economic Report of the President, Jan 1962, p. 85. 
3 Economic Report of the President, Jan 1963,  p. 55. 
  4deceleration effect materializes only with a lag.  Any convincing 




  This was not the only view of monetary and fiscal policy at that time.  The 1960s 
saw the rise of “monetarism” subsequent to the work of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), 
Friedman and Meiselman (1963), and Andersen and Jordan (1968).  There were several 
planks in the monetarism platform.  First and foremost was that sustained inflation was a 
monetary phenomenon and that central banks should be held accountable for maintaining 
price stability.  Monetarists contended that central banks should control the stock of 
money in the economy, and not focus on targeting short-term nominal interest rates, as 
the mechanism to achieve this long-run inflation objective.  The rationale for the focus on 
the growth of the money stock was that, in a fiat money economy, the money stock 
provided the nominal anchor for the system. 
  In the eyes of monetarists, inflation control was not the only concern of the 
monetary authorities.  They saw monetary policy as having significant effects on short-
run fluctuations in real output (Andersen and Jordan, 1968;  Andersen and Carlson, 
1970), though not affecting long-run output growth.  Indeed many monetarists (see 
Brunner and Meltzer, 1968; Meltzer, 1995, 2003; and Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) saw 
monetary policy as responsible for aggravating, not attenuating historical cyclical 
fluctuations in real output. 
  With the “rational expectations revolution” in macroeconomics came the “policy 
ineffectiveness proposition” of the New Classical Macroeconomics (Sargent and 
Wallace, 1975).  The initial interpretations of this paradigm were that, in any 
macroeconomic model, the assumption of rational expectations would render monetary 
                                                 
4 Economic Report of the President, February, 1975, pp. 128-9 
  5policy ineffective in influencing real output, both in the short run and long run.  Hence 
there was no role for monetary policy in output stabilization.  Subsequent research 
(Fischer, 1977, Taylor, 1980, and Calvo, 1983) demonstrated that it was the interaction of 
the rational expectations hypothesis and an assumption of perfectly flexible wages and/or 
prices that generated the “policy ineffectiveness proposition.”  The outgrowth of this 
insight was the “New Keynesian” perspective. 
  With the widespread use of “New Keynesian” models, the monetarist tenets about 
how “monetary policy” impacts economic activity are widely held throughout academia 
and central banking circles today, though most academics and almost all central bankers 
would disown a monetarist label.  Money has largely disappeared from discussions on 
monetary policy. Fry et al. (2000), utilizing data from a Bank of England survey, report 
that in the 1970s 11 (of 22) central banks in industrial countries reported using a money 
and credit framework to formulate monetary policy; but, that by the 1990s, only 2 of 
these banks maintained this framework.
5  Von Hagen (2004) found a negative trend from 
1970 – 2002 in the fraction of titles of articles in major economics journals that included 
the word “money,” though the frequency of titles including “inflation” was relatively 
constant.
6  He also found that the frequency of “money” in the annual reports of major 
central banks declined over the period 1996-2002.
7  King (2002) notes: 
… there is a paradox in the role of money in economic policy.  It is this: 
that as price stability has become recognized as the central objective of 




                                                 
5 Fry et al., (2000), Chart 7.2, p. 123. 
6 Von Hagen (2004), Table 4. 
7 Von Hagen, (2004), Table 5 
8 King, (2002), p. 162 
  6The decline and fall of money in policy formation is confirmed by a fall in 
the number of references to money in speeches of central bank governors.  
So much so that over the past two years, Governor Eddie George has made 
one reference to money in 29 speeches, Chairman Greenspan one in 17, 
Governor Hayami one in 11 and Wim Duisenberg three in 30.
9
 
In contemporary literature, models, and policy discussions, attention is given to 
the role of an inflation objective in a central bank “policy rule” as the nominal anchor in a 
fiat money economy.  “Taylor rules” (Taylor, 1993) that specify a systematic relation 
between the target for a short-term interest rate and deviations of inflation from an 
inflation target and real output from a measure of “potential output” have become the 
norm for the analysis of the impact of monetary policy.
10  In this “rule like” environment, 
the setting of the interest rate value is the policy action; the policy itself is represented by 
the parameters of the “rule,” including the inflation objective ( ) and the respective 
weights that are assigned to deviation of observed inflation from that objective and 
deviations of real output from “potential output.” 
* π
2.  Long-run Stabilization Objectives for Monetary Policy 
 
Over the past 15 years, a number of countries, starting with New Zealand, have 
announced explicit numeric inflation objectives (the   term in the Taylor rule 
framework.)    The relevant question is how effective are central banks at hitting explicit 
numeric inflation targets? 
* π
Clearly one straightforward way to address the question of the effectiveness of 
monetary policy is to look at the performance of those countries that have announced 
                                                 
9 King, (2002), p. 162-3. 
10 There is an active discussion in the contemporary literature over the design of monetary policy rules.  
Some economists (for example, Svensson, 2005) argue for instrument rules that are optimized from an 
objective function of the central bank and models of the macroeconomy.  Others (for example, McCallum 
and Nelson, 2004) argue for independently constructed target rules in the spirit of Taylor (1993).  Both 
sides in this debate appear to accept the proposition that monetary policy can impact both inflation and real 
  7explicit numeric inflation targets.  Our list of the countries in this group is shown in Table 
1.  We have identified a total of 21 countries that continue to pursue such targets.
11  The 
initial inflation under which the target was adopted by each of these countries is graphed 
against the year of adoption in Figure 1.
12  As far as we have been able to determine, no 
country has joined the group since 2002.  In many, but certainly not all of these countries, 
inflation was below 5 percent at the time of the announcement of the inflation targeting 
regime.  Table 2 provides the details on the target index(es), the target ranges, dates of 
adoption for the target, responsibility for target setting, and public reporting on the 
performance of the inflation policy. 
 Figures 2-22 show the history of inflation for each of the inflation targeting 
countries.
13  There are multiple graphs for those countries that have changed the index in 
which they define their inflation target – one graph for each index used.  The graphs 
show the inflation target range (the shaded area) or the point inflation target as 
appropriate. It is immediately apparent from these graphs that the period-to-period 
(month-to-month or quarter-to-quarter) annualized rate of inflation is highly volatile in all 
of the countries that pursue an explicit numeric inflation target. These short-run inflation 
rates are as likely as not to be outside of the target range.  If effective monetary policy 
were to be defined in terms of stability of high-frequency rates of inflation, then all of 
these central banks would have to be judged as failing to achieve the objective.  
However, it is neither reasonable nor desirable to define the objective in such short-run 
                                                                                                                                                 
output in the short run, but only inflation in the long run.  Hence this theoretical debate is about how to best 
implement monetary policy rules, not about the effectiveness of policy. 
11 We consider three countries that at one time had explicit numeric targets − Finland, Spain, and Greece − 
that have dropped from the group upon accession to the EMU. 
12 This graph updates similar graphs that can be found in Loayza and Soto (2002) and Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002). 
  8terms.  Shocks to the price level − that is transitory shocks to inflation − originate from 
numerous sources, both monetary and nonmonetary.  No central bank can foresee such 
shocks and probably cannot accurately predict the dynamics by which such shocks 
ultimately impact the price level.  Economic theory suggests that central banks can be 
held accountable for “sustained inflation.” Correspondingly, inflation targeting central 
banks, and even central banks without explicit numeric targets such as the Fed, typically 
focus on “medium term” inflation.  The duration of the “medium term,” frequently, and 
probably intentionally, is left ambiguous.
14  Absent a precise definition of the “medium 
term” some measures must be specified to judge the “effectiveness” of the inflation 
targeting policies. 
 We examine two measures of the effectiveness of explicit numeric inflation 
targeting.  Both measures are based on moving averages of the observed rates of 
inflation.  These measures are indicated by the red (heavy) line in the figures.  Relative to 
the dates indicated on the horizontal axis, this line shows the leading moving average rate 
of inflation to the end of 2004.  The shortest moving average shown is one year.  The 
question is what is the maximum period, ending with 2004, that the moving average of 
the inflation rate remained within the bounds determined by the current (end of 2004) 
inflation target?  These periods are shown for each of the inflation targeting countries in 
Table 3. 
Judged by this metric, there are a number of inflation targeting countries in which 
monetary policy has been very effective.  For five countries, New Zealand, Norway, 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 For early discussions of the implementation and experience of several  of these countries with inflation 
targeting, see Leiderman and Svensson (1995). 
  9Switzerland, Thailand, and the United Kingdom the moving average rate of inflation has 
been within the current announced target range since before the adoption of the inflation 
targeting procedure.
15  Canada and Australia also have maintained average inflation 
within the range currently in effect for considerable periods (note that for Australia and 
New Zealand, data are quarterly, not monthly.)  None of these countries has a particularly 
wide target range.  The Czech Republic and South Africa have shorter records of success 
by this metric but, nevertheless moderately, effective performances.  The Czech Republic 
is notable, since the inflation rate there was fairly high when the target was adopted, and 
the moving average inflation has fallen outside of the target range only on the low side. 
Nevertheless, the moving average of Czech headline inflation has been positive for the 
entire period since it fell below the lower bound of the current target range (in February 
2002.)   Israel, Peru, and Poland have experienced long-term average inflation below 
their current target ranges.  The short-horizon moving averages for Hungary, Peru, and 
Poland have exceeded the current target range.  In Israel the moving average inflation 
rate actually went negative in 2002 and 2003.  Three countries, Chile, Colombia, and 
Hungary have adjusted their targets downward over time and generally the average 
inflation rate has fallen below the ranges, consistent with success in moving to the lower 
inflation targets.  Failure to stay in the target ranges has not been asymmetric.  Other 
countries, notably Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines have consistently missed their 
target ranges on the high side.   
                                                                                                                                                 
14 President Santomero of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has stated that he prefers measuring 
inflation against an explicit target range on a 12-month moving average (year-over-year) basis.  Few central  
bankers have been this explicit about their definitions of a “medium term.” 
15 Norway has a stated target of 2.5 percent, not an inflation range.  The moving average inflation rate has 
been below this value since 2000 and only dipped slightly below zero in early 2003. 
  10While averages provide interesting insights into the sustainability of the inflation 
performance, they obscure the marginal performance.  A moving average could remain 
within the target range for a long period of time because, over time, the inflation rate is 
converging towards the midpoint of the range.  Alternatively, the same moving average 
could result because, early in the period, the inflation rate was close to one end point of 
the target range and, as time progressed, inflation moved close to the opposite edge of the 
target range. The latter situation could be characterized as “skating on thin ice.”  
 To examine this issue, Table 3 shows the value of the moving average over the 
two-year period 2003-4 and a standardized deviation of this two-year moving average 
from the midpoint of the target range that prevailed at the end of 2004.  The 
standardization is constructed by dividing the deviation of the moving average from the 
midpoint by one-half the difference between the upper and lower endpoints of the target 
range. 
By this metric the bulk of the inflation targeting countries are doing quite well in 
the past two years.  The exceptions are Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, Mexico, and the 
Philippines (whose average inflation rate over the past two years fell above their target 
ranges) and Israel and Sweden (whose average inflation rate over the past two years fell 
below the target ranges.) 
Our conclusion from these data is that, where countries have announced explicit 
numeric inflation objectives for their central banks, central banks have been quite 
effective in achieving the stated inflation stabilization objective.  
The FOMC has not adopted this framework, though it is known that on at least 
three occasions the pros and cons of adopting this approach have been debated around the 
  11FOMC table.
16  Several current participants in the FOMC have stated on the record their 
preference for explicit numeric targets and given their preferred measures.  Included are 
Governor Ben Bernanke, President Jeffrey Lacker of the Richmond Fed, President Janet 
Yellen of the San Francisco Fed, and President Anthony Santomero of the Philadelphia 
Fed.
17
Governor Bernanke has indicated his preferred inflation target is 1-2 percent as 
measured by the core personal consumption price index.
18  President Lacker indicated his 
preference for a target of 2 percent as measured by the core CPI price index or 1.5 as 
measured by the core personal consumption price index.  He also indicated a preference 
that inflation be kept above 1 percent.
19  President Yellen has indicated a preference for a 
target of 1.5 percent as measured by the core personal consumption price index, with a 
range of about ± 1 percent.
20  President Santomero has indicated his preference for a 
target range of 1-3 percent as measured by a 12-month moving average rate of change in 
the core personal consumption price index.
21  Other current participants at FOMC 
meetings, including Governor Donald Kohn (2005), have indicated that they do not prefer 
an explicit numeric inflation objective.  President William Poole has stated that he 
                                                 
16 Transcripts of two of these debates, on January 31, 1995 and July 2, 1996 can be found on the Web site 
of the Board of Governors:< http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/transcripts/transcripts_1995.htm>; 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/transcripts/transcripts_1996.htm>.  A summary of the most recent 
debate at the February 1, 2005, FOMC meeting is also available on the Board’s Web site 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/20050202.htm>. 
17 During the July 1996 FOMC debate on inflation targets, President Gary Stern of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis indicated that a 2 percent target (in terms of the CPI) would be acceptable to him. 
(FOMC Transcripts, July 2-3, 1996, p. 56)  The discussion at that time was not framed in terms of a target 
point or a target range. 
18 For instance B.S Bernanke remarks at Stanford University, February 11, 2005. Reported by Michael 
Derby Dow Jones Commodity Wire, February 11, 2005. 
19 J.M. Lacker, “Inflation Targeting and the Conduct of Monetary Policy,” University of Richmond Robins 
School of Business, March 1, 2005.  <http://www.rich.frb.org/media/speeches/index.cfm/id=70>. 
20 “Fed’s Yellen says inflation target has some merit,” Reuters News, February 11, 2005. 
21 “Santomero: Fed should adopt explicit inflation target,” AFX Asia, October 4, 2004. 
  12believes “ambiguity with respect to the Fed’s inflation and employment objectives is not 
large and is not the main problem the Fed faces with its communication policies.”
22
Differences of opinion among FOMC participants notwithstanding, in May 2003 
the press release following the FOMC meeting indicated that “the probability of an 
unwelcome substantial fall in inflation, though minor, exceeds that of a pickup in 
inflation from its already low level.”
23  The minutes of that FOMC meeting indicate the 
rationale for this statement: 
Members commented that substantial additional disinflation would be 
unwelcome because of the likely negative effects on economic activity and 
the functioning of financial institutions and markets, and the increased 
difficulty of conducting an effective monetary policy, at least potentially 
in the event the economy was subjected to adverse shocks. Members also 
agreed that there was only a remote possibility that the process of 
disinflation would cumulate to the point of a decline for an extended 
period in the general price level.
24
At that time, core personal consumption inflation was in the neighborhood of 1 
percent.  Since FOMC participants who have expressed preferences in terms of both the 
core CPI and core personal consumption price index have typically indicated values for 
core CPI inflation a half percent above those for the core personal consumption inflation 
rate, it seems reasonable to conclude that the FOMC has a lower bound  of an acceptable 
medium-term rate of inflation in the neighborhood of 1 percent for the core personal 
consumption inflation rate and perhaps 1.5 percent for the core CPI inflation rate.  
Former Governor Larry Meyer (2001) is also on record in favor of an explicit 
numeric inflation objective. However, his position is that the “dual mandate” inherent in 
                                                 
22 “How Should the Fed Communicate,” Princeton University, April 2, 2005.  
<http://stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/2005/4_02_05.htm>. 
23 <http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2003/20030506/default.htm> 
  13the Federal Reserve Act differentiates the U.S. environment from that of other inflation 
targeting central banks that operate under a “hierarchical mandate.”  Meyer defines a 
“hierarchical mandate” as an environment “where price stability is identified as the 
principal objective, and central banks are restricted from pursuing other objectives unless 
price stability has been achieved.”
25  He contrasts this with the “dual mandate” where 
“monetary policy is directed at promoting both full employment and price stability with 
no priority expressed, and with the central bank responsible for balancing both these 
objectives in the short run.”
26
It is our opinion that Meyer’s view does not allow for the different in the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in the long and short run.  In terms of long-run 
objectives, central banks must necessarily operate under a hierarchical mandate, given the 
consensus view of monetary policy that policymakers are not presented a long-run 
tradeoff between inflation and real output.  Indeed, in specifying a policy rule, whether an 
instrument or target rule, the exercise of determining how much weight to place on short-
run movements in inflation versus short-run movements in real output is conditioned on 
the prespecification of the long-run inflation target  ( ).  In this sense any central bank 
seeking to operate in such a monetary policy framework has to be hierarchical: first it 
must specify its long-run inflation objective and then, and only then, can it set its 
preferred (or optimal) weights for short-run fluctuations.
* π
27  The choice of weights could 
be such that the central bank follows a hierarchical mandate in both the long and short 
run; however there is nothing to preclude pursuing a dual short-run mandate nested 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 < http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/20030506.htm> 
25   Meyer (2001), p. 151. 
26  ibid. 
  14within a hierarchical long-run mandate.  It is likely that most, if not all, central banks that 
have adopted an explicit inflation target pursue that objective within a nested 
hierarchical/dual structure. 
In Figure 23a and 23b the core CPI inflation and core personal consumption price 
inflation for the United States and the leading moving average from each of the dates 
since January 1990 until the end of 2004 are shown.
28  We have superimposed on these 
time series a shaded area from 1 to 3 percent, which appears to approximate a consensus 
of the FOMC participants who have spoken out in favor of an explicit numeric inflation 
objective.  Leading moving-average core CPI inflation in the United States bottomed out 
in August 2002 at a value of 1.64 percent (annual rate). The corresponding dates and 
values for core personal consumption price inflation are December 2002 and 1.28 
percent. These appear to be close to the bottom of the FOMC’s implicit acceptable range 
of inflation. On the other end of the scale, the leading moving-average rate of core CPI 
inflation has been below the 3 percent level since March, 1991, while that for personal 
consumption price inflation has  been below the three percent level since March 1987.  
These are comparable to the best performance of the inflation targeting central banks 
against their announced targets.  From this, it cannot be claimed that an explicit numeric 
inflation target is a necessary condition to produce low and stable rates of inflation for an 
extended period.  The question, which will not be answered unless inflation pressures 
build in the future, is whether in the absence of a public numeric inflation objective the 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 See also Svensson (2004). 
28 Relative to the end of 2004, the line indicates a trailing moving average of inflation back to the date 
indicated. 
  15institutional commitment exists to take potentially unpopular policy actions to resist 
upward creep in inflation.   
3. How Effective Are Central Banks at Short-run (Output) Stabilization? 
 
The evidence on the effectiveness of monetary policy as a short-run stabilization 
device is problematic.   As Poole has noted: 
The only certainty is that [the] effect of policy actions on real variables 
eventually dissipates.  “Eventually” may cover a period of several years, 
and may be longer in some circumstances than others.  It is worth noting 
that these hedges on my part reflect ignorance — mine and the 
profession’s — and not obfuscations.  We just don’t have precise 




 Our objective here is to examine why a definitive answer to this question remains 
so illusive. On one hand there is “case study” evidence supporting the idea that monetary 
policy does impact output fluctuations in the short run.  The most prominent evidence 
from such studies highlights the contractionary effects of monetary policy.  On the other 
hand there are volumes of VAR analyses that fail to determine a major role for monetary 
policy in short-run stabilization. 
  The best known, though not uncontested, case study analysis of the short-run 
response of real activity to monetary policy is Friedman and Schwartz’s monetary history 
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963.)  They argue that the Federal Reserve put the “great” in 
the Great Contraction: 
The monetary character of the contraction changed drastically in late 
1930, when several large bank failures led to the first of what were to 
prove a series of liquidity crises involving runs on banks and bank failures 
on a scale unprecedented in our history. …  
 
                                                 
29 W. Poole, Oct. 6, 2004 , FOMC Transparency. http://stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/2004/10_06_04.html. 
  16  The drastic decline in the stock of money and the occurrence of a 
banking panic of unprecedented severity did not reflect the absence of 
power on the part of the Reserve System to prevent them.  Throughout the 
contraction, the System had ample powers to cut short the tragic process 
of monetary deflation and banking collapse.  Had it used those powers 
effectively in late 1930 or even in early or mid-1931, the successive 
liquidity crises that in retrospect are the distinctive feature of the 
contraction could almost certainly have been prevented and the stock of 
money kept from declining, or indeed, increased to any desired extent. 
Such action would have eased the severity of the contraction and very 
likely would have brought it to an end at a much earlier date.
30
 
Romer and Romer (1989) construct case studies of six episodes from World War 
II through 1979 in which they believe that the Fed deliberately took action to induce a 
recession to reduce inflation.  They conclude that the evidence supports the hypothesis 
that the monetary policy actions had a significant negative impact on real output in all of 
these instances.  Case studies such as these address the qualitative question of whether 
monetary policy has an impact on real output; they do not address the question of the 
magnitude of the output response to a change in policy. 
The final experience that is widely cited as evidence of a contractionary impact of 
monetary policy is the U.S. experience in 1979-83:  the so-called “Volcker disinflation.”  
This period is marked by two separate recessions: January – July 1980 and July 1981 – 
November 1982.  The first recession followed closely the introduction of the “new 
operating procedures” in October 1979 and an increase of 6 percent in the federal funds 
rate.
31  Note that the increase in the funds rate was not directly targeted by the Fed under 
the “new operating procedures.”  Furthermore, the impact of the monetary policy action 
                                                 
30 Friedman and Schwartz (1963), pp. 10-11. 
31 For an analysis of the environment that led to the introduction of the “new operating procedures” and the 
objectives that the Volcker Fed sought to achieve with this innovation see Lindsey, Orphanides, and Rasche 
(2005). 
  17in 1980 is confounded with the introduction of credit controls by the Carter 
Administration in March 1980.
32   
Goodfriend maintains that the recession of 1981-2 was the direct consequence of 
monetary policy directed at disinflation: 
The lesson of 1980 was that the Fed could not restore credibility for low 
inflation if it continued to utilize interest rate policy to stabilize the output 
gap.  … As measured by personal consumption expenditures (PCE) 
inflation, which was about 10 percent in Q1 1981, real short-term interest 
rates were then a very high 9 percent.  Not surprisingly, the aggressive 
policy tightening began to take hold by midyear.
33
 
Certainly the home building industry in the United States regarded the collapse of 
housing construction during both recessions as the direct responsibility of the Volcker 
Fed – as evidenced by the numerous complaints delivered to the Board of Governors on 
2x4s.  The housing construction industry in the United States showed highly cyclical 
fluctuations through the recession of 1990-1 (see Figure 24), and concerns about the 
sensitivity of this industry to monetary policy actions had been the focus of discussion at 
least since the early 1960s.
34  
  Housing starts and housing construction behaved very differently in the 2001 
recession than in prior postwar recessions:  no slowdown is obvious.  Admittedly, this 
cyclical slowdown was very mild, at least as measured in terms of real output growth. 
Yet this raises the question of whether cyclical fluctuations in housing should be cited as 
universal evidence of an impact of monetary policy on short-run fluctuations.
35  
                                                 
32 See Schreft (1990). 
33 Goodfriend (2005) , pp. 316-7. 
34 See, for example, Housing and Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series  
Number 4, October 1970; Grebler and Maisel, 1963. 
35 Stock and Watson (2003) note the large decline in the volatility of residential construction (though not 
nonresidential construction) in the United States since the mid-1980s (p. 39). 
  18One legacy of the Great Depression in the United States was price controls on 
bank deposits – so-called Reg Q ceilings.  In 1966 these controls were extended to 
liabilities of thrift institutions that, at the time, were the principal source of mortgage 
financing.  Cyclical fluctuations in interest rates had a major impact on the availability of 
mortgage financing during this period.  By the mid-1980s these price controls had been 
removed, but by that time (economic) insolvency was widespread among thrift 
institutions.  The resolution of the crisis in the housing finance industry continued 
through the recession of 1990-1.  Hence, it may be more appropriate to argue that the 
interaction of monetary policy with the system of deposit price controls produced a 
unique environment that supported a cyclical response of the economy to monetary 
policy actions.  In the current U.S. environment, where mortgage securitization has 
become the rule and specialized deposit intermediaries have ceased to be significant 
players in mortgage finance, a traditional argument for the transmission of monetary 
policy may be more tenuous.   
  Alternative evidence on the effectiveness of monetary policy to influence the 
short-run behavior of real output is from econometric models.  Over the past 25 years, 
since the publication of Sims’s (1980) classic article, literally hundreds, perhaps 
thousands, of econometric studies in vector autocorrelation (VAR) frameworks have 
sought to address this question.  We believe that few people would argue that research in 
this framework has provided conclusive evidence to support the hypothesis that monetary 
policy has strong short-run effects on real output fluctuations.  Christiano, Eichenbaum, 
and Evans (1999) summarize their extensive overview of this literature: “viewed across 
both sets of identification strategies that we have discussed, there is a great deal of 
  19uncertainty about the importance of monetary policy shocks in aggregate fluctuations”
36 
and “there is agreement that monetary policy shocks account for only a very modest 
percentage of the volatility of aggregate output; they account for even less of the 
movements in the aggregate price level.”
37  But if a consensus from “case studies” of 
historical episodes is that there are substantial effects, the question is how to reconcile the 
apparently conflicting evidence? An early assessment of the VAR type of study is 
provided by Cagan (1989): 
If we accept the bulk of historical evidence as confirming the important 
monetary effects on the real economy, contrary findings cannot be fully 
valid.  And, if such contrary evidence is not valid, what kind of evidence 
in monetary research is acceptable and convincing?
38
 
The VAR seems to me to be hopelessly unreliable and low in power to 
detect monetary effects of the kind we are looking for and believe, from 
other kinds of evidence, to exist.
39
 
  In the approximately fifteen years since Cagan posed this question, analysts have 
become much more aware of the limitations of VAR analyses.  It is now well understood 
that the VAR approach does not solve the fundamental econometric problem of 
identification.  The VARs that are readily estimated using standard econometric software 
are no more than reduced-form models.
40  Indeed, there is substantial risk of 
misspecification from omitted variables given limits on the dimensionality of the typical 
VAR that is imposed by the available time span of macroeconomic data series. 
  In the formative years of VAR analysis (say 1980-6) the typical approach was to 
“rotate and orthogonalize shocks” by computing a Cholesky decomposition of the 
                                                 
36 Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), p. 127. 
37 Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), p. 71. 
38 Cagan (1989), p. 119. 
39 Cagan (1989), p. 127. 
  20covariance matrix of the estimated VAR residuals and to assume that one of the resulting 
“shocks,” frequently that associated with a short-term interest rate, represented the 
monetary policy innovation – the unpredictable component of monetary policy.  Analyses 
of the effectiveness of monetary policy were constructed from impulse response 
functions and variance decompositions with respect to this “monetary shock.” 
  Gradually, it became recognized that “recursiveness and orthogonalization” is the 
imposition of a particular set of identifying restrictions – a triangular Wold causal chain 
structure.
41   This approach to identification was widely rejected by the econometrics 
establishment when initially proposed in the 1960s.  Starting in the mid 1980s, alternative 
restrictions for identification of “structural VARs” appeared in the literature.
42  Generally 
the SVAR (Structural VAR) framework has maintained the identifying restrictions that 
shocks in the “economic model” are independent and found the additional required 
restrictions among the only available alternatives: constraints on impact or steady-state 
multipliers of the SVAR or exclusion restrictions on the slope coefficients among 
contemporaneous variables or steady-state relationships in the SVAR. 
  Steady-state identifying restrictions are those for which accepted theory provides 
the most insight.  Such restrictions may provide information on the dynamics of a real 
output response to a monetary policy shock that produces a permanent change in the  
inflation rate (assuming that inflation is approximately a nonstationary variable during 
the sample period).  This is facilitated by received macroeconomic theories that suggest 
only monetary shocks can produced sustained changes in inflation.  In an economy where 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 For an extensive discussion of the identification problem in VAR models see, Christiano, Eichenbaum, 
and Evans (1999) Section 2. 
41 See Wold (1954, 1960).   
42 See, for example, Sims (1986) and Bernanke (1986). 
  21the central bank focuses on a rule for an interest rate target that responds to deviations  
from a desired rate of inflation and other variables such as output gaps, such monetary 
shocks occur only when there is a change in the inflation target.
43  This does not get to 
the question of the effectiveness of monetary policy for short-run output stabilization.  
Here the issue is how real output responds to monetary shocks that cause transitory 
fluctuations in the inflation rate (i.e., changes in the price level.)   
  Unfortunately, received theories suggest that shocks from many nonmonetary 
sources can have a permanent impact on the price level.  Examples include fiscal policy 
shocks, energy price shocks, productivity shocks, and terms-of-trade shocks.  In such 
economic structures restrictions on impact multipliers are hard to justify, and sufficient 
restrictions on slope coefficients among the contemporaneous variables in the VAR to 
identify the desired monetary shock are problematic.  This concern is echoed in Romer 
and Romer (1989): 
  
The reason that purely statistical tests, such as regressions of output on 
money, studies of the effects of  “anticipated” and “unanticipated” money, 
and vector autoregressions, probably have not played a crucial role in 
forming most economists’ views about the real effects of monetary 




  Identification of the effectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize output 
fluctuation is further complicated by a lack of transparency and likely a lack of 
stationarity in the “rule-like” behavior of central banks.  There is an ongoing debate about 
whether FOMC behavior over a long period can be characterized by a common “rule-
like” specification.  Romer and Romer (2002a,b) argue that the actions of the FOMC in 
                                                 
43 This conclusion should hold whether the central bank pursues an instrument rule or a target rule. 
44 Romer and Romer (1989), p. 121. 
  22the 1950s and in the 1980-90s were similar in their “rule-like” characteristics, but that 
during the 1960s and 70s a different “regime” was in place.  Orphanides (2001, 2002) 
and Orphanides and van Norden (2002) argue that, when judged in terms of “real-time” 
data, the “rule-like” behavior of the FOMC in the 1960s and 70s is consistent with 
behavior in the 80s and 90s.  They conclude that the Great Inflation did not result from 
bad policy, but from applying reasonable policy without recognition of and adjustment 
for biased measurements of “potential output.”  Either view of the 1960-70s poses a 
challenge to the standard approach of identifying monetary shocks in SVAR structures. 
  Beyond the arguments about the specification of monetary policy during the Great 
Inflation, there are other objectives that at least occasionally dominate the concern of 
central bankers.  Such incidents at a minimum contaminate efforts to identify policy rules 
with measurement error and likely also contaminate the assumed identifying restrictions. 
  For the FOMC there are at least four incidents in the past 20 years that can be 
documented in the published record of Minutes and Transcripts in which concerns about 
financial stability dominated policy decisions and policy actions were driven by issues 
other than inflation or output stabilization.  These incidents include the stock market 
collapse in October 1987, the Asian crisis/Russian default in August-October 1998, Y2K 
in late 1999, and the 9/11 tragedy in September 2001. Some analysts add the credit 
crunch/financial headwinds concern in 1990-3 to this list.
45  
  According to the “Unofficial Staff Interpretations of FOMC Policy Changes” 
compiled by Thornton and Wheelock (2000), the expected funds rate was decreased by 
37.5 basis points on October 23, 1987, and by an additional 12.5 to 25 basis points on 
October 28, 1987, in response to the stock market crash.  This interrupted the succession 
  23of increases in the expected funds rate that had started on January 15, 1987.  Increases in 
the expected funds rate were not resumed until March 29, 1988, roughly six months after 
the crash.  During a conference call on October 20, 1987, Chairman Greenspan noted: 
I think we’re playing it on a day-to-day basis. And in a crisis environment. 
I suspect we shouldn’t really focus on longer-term policy questions until 
we get beyond this immediate period of chaos. ( p. 3)  
  On September 29, 1998, FOMC reduced the funds rate target by 25 basis points.  
This was followed by a two additional reductions of 25 basis points on October 15 and 
November 17.  In all three cases, the press release accompanying the policy actions noted 
conditions in financial markets as a rationale for the action: 
The action was taken to cushion the effects on prospective economic 
growth in the United States of increasing weakness in foreign economies 
and of less accommodative financial conditions domestically. (FOMC 
Press Release, September 29, 1998) 
Growing caution by lenders and unsettled conditions in financial markets 
more generally are likely to be restraining aggregate demand in the future. 
(FOMC Press Release, October 15, 1998) 
Although conditions in financial markets have settled down materially 
since mid-October, unusual strains remain. (FOMC Press Release, 
November 17, 1998) 
The funds rate target established in November was maintained until the FOMC meeting 
in June 1999, though no argument was made that financial markets remained unsettled 
after November. 
  On December 21, 1999, the FOMC press release noted that the funds rate target 
was kept unchanged, in spite of  
… the possibility that over time increases in demand will continue to 
exceed the growth in potential supply, even after taking account of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 See, for example, Romer and Romer, (2002b), p. 68. 
  24remarkable rise in productivity growth. (FOMC Press Release, December 
21, 1999) 
The maintenance of the existing target funds rate was explained by concerns about the 
century date change: 
Nonetheless, in light of market uncertainties associated with the century 
date change, the Committee decided to adopt a symmetric directive in 
order to indicate that the focus of policy in the intermeeting period must 
be ensuring a smooth transition into the Year 2000. (FOMC Press Release, 
December 21, 1999) 
  On September 17, 2001, the FOMC press release noted that the funds rate target 
was reduced 50 basis points in response to the uncertainty about financial market 
conditions in light of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center: 
The Federal Reserve will continue to supply unusually large volumes of 
liquidity to the financial markets, as needed, until more normal market 
functioning is restored. (FOMC Press Release, September 17, 2001) 
On October 2, 2001, the funds rate target was reduced by an additional 50 basis points 
and uncertainty in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks was again cited: 
The terrorist attacks have significantly heightened uncertainty in an 
economy that was already weak. (FOMC Press Release, October 2, 2001) 
Finally on November 6, 2001, the funds rate target was again reduced by 50 basis points.   
The policy action was explained: 
Heightened uncertainty and concerns about a deterioration in business 
conditions both here and abroad are damping economic activity. (FOMC 
Press Release, November 6, 2001) 
It is worth noting that while in real time FOMC participants were concerned about 
significant weakness in economic activity in the fourth quarter of 2001, the current 
estimate is that GDP grew at a positive 1.6 percent annual rate in that quarter.  
  25  Our conclusion from these questions is that considerable care and additional 
research is required to ensure that a valid identified model of the economy has been 
constructed from which to draw inferences about the effectiveness of monetary policy as 
a tool for short-run stabilization of an economy.  The number of issues that remain to be 
addressed suggest that we are a long way from a definitive answer. 
  If the objective of a well-identified model is achieved, then how should it be used 
to address the question of the effectiveness of monetary policy?  Impulse response 
functions and variance decompositions that investigate the response to a monetary shock 
may not be the most informative analyses.   These address only how the economy 
responds to the unpredictable component of monetary policy – the deviations from “rule-
like” behavior.  Cagan (1989) complained that in the VAR analysis available at the time, 
the impact of such residuals was so small as to be implausible: 
By removing all serial and cross correlations from economic series, VAR 
reduces them to exogenous movements and looks for correlation between 
these movements in each pair of series.  But these exogenous movements 
are little more that isolated blips in the series, which in monetary growth 
have little effect on GNP.  The financial system filters out the effect on 
monetary blips.  Only changes in monetary growth that are maintained for 
an extended period of time affect business activity  These extended 
changes in monetary growth, however, exhibit serial correlation and, 
despite their variable lags in affecting output and prices, tend to be 
correlated with cyclical movements in other economic variables.  The 
VAR accordingly eliminates the correlated movements in money as 
endogenous to the economic system.  Thus does this technique give new 
meaning to the old cliché of “throwing the baby out with the bathwater.”
46
  An alternative investigation is to vary the parameters in the equation of the 
identified economic model that characterize the “rule-like” behavior of the monetary 
authorities.  The question then becomes not how effective has monetary policy been 
  26stabilizing the economy under the historical characterization of policy, but how effective 
could it be with alternative “rule-like” behaviors.   Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
(1999) argue that with, VAR models, this type of analysis may be difficult, since 
identification of monetary policy shocks is not sufficient to identify the historical policy 
rule pursued by the central bank.
47 The answer to the question of how effective monetary 
policy could be in short-run stabilization likely depends on the nature of the shocks that 
are assumed to hit the economy and, at least for some shocks, the relative tolerance for 
short-run inflation volatility versus output volatility. 
  Finally, has increased transparency and accountability of monetary authorities led 
to increased economic stability?  This question has been raised in several contexts.  First, 
some analysts have argued that the “Great Moderation” since approximately 1983 is 
substantially due to better monetary policy and improved transparency.  Stock and 
Watson (2003) use three different econometric models of the U.S. economy and replace 
their estimate of a post-1984 monetary policy rule with their estimate of a pre-1979 
monetary policy rule. They conclude from these experiments that the models “all suggest 
that improved monetary control brought inflation under control, but accounts for only a 
small fraction – among the models fit to the United States data, less than 10 percent – of 
the reduction in output volatility.”
48
  Other analysts argue that improved transparency and accountability of central 
banks anchor long-term inflation expectations more firmly, thus giving central banks 
more latitude to pursue short-run stabilization objectives.  Support for this argument 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 Cagan (1989), p.135. 
47 Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), pp. 134-6. 
  27requires two kinds of research: 1) what evidence would support the hypothesis that long-
term inflation expectations are less variable and 2) has the “rule-like” behavior of any 
central bank changed in the direction of more aggressive reaction to short-term 
fluctuations of output?  Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) provide some evidence on 
both of these issues by comparing inflation targeting industrial countries with industrial 
countries that do not announce inflation targets.  They conclude that inflation targeting in 
these countries has “played a role in anchoring inflation expectations and in reducing 
inflation persistence.”
49  
  Chairman Greenspan early on argued that a low and stable inflation environment 
contributed to the higher rate of productivity growth in the United States after 1995: 
Given these real-world uncertainties, it is important for policymakers to be 
as explicit as possible about not only the central bank’s long-run inflation 
objective but also about its short-run policy objectives.  The more 
ambiguous policymakers are about these objectives, the more difficult it 
will be for the public to differentiate policy actions that may reflect a 
change in the central bank’s long-run inflation objective from actions 
intended only to offset the effects of real shocks on economic activity. … 
Implicit in that argument, if we are to move toward price stability, is that 
the process in and of itself induces an acceleration of productivity.
50
 
It is not that low or stable prices are an environment that is conducive to 
capital investment to reduce costs, but rather that it is an environment that 
forces productivity enhancements. It forces people who want to stay in 
business to take those actions--such as cutting down the size of the 
cafeteria, reducing overtime, and taking away managers’ drivers—that 
they did not want to take before in the ordinary course of business in a 
modest inflationary environment because it was easier then just to raise 
prices to maintain margins. If you force the price level down, you induce 
real reallocations of resources because to stay in business firms have to 
achieve real as distinct from nominal efficiencies.
51
  
                                                                                                                                                 
48 Stock and Watson (2003), p. 29. 
49 Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004), p. 75 
50 FOMC Transcripts, July 2-3, 1996, p. 47 
51 FOMC Transcripts, July 2-3, 1996, p. 67 
  28This is an intriguing hypothesis that is difficult to investigate, given the limited 
understanding and theory of the determinants of productivity growth.  Unfortunately it is 
difficult to reconcile this hypothesis with the apparent uniqueness of the U.S. experience 
with the “productivity boom” in the face of almost worldwide low and stable inflation 
over the last decade. 
4.  Problems in the Implementation of Short-run Stabilization Policy 
  One important issue for the implementation of short-run stabilization policy that 
did not receive much attention for a considerable period of time is the inherent 
uncertainty of the environment in which central bankers make decisions.  There are 
several dimensions to this uncertainty: 1) lack of accurate information about the 
contemporary state of the economy, 2) inability to forecast accurately the future path of 
the economy, and 3) lack of accurate information about how policy actions impact the 
economy. 
  Two problems face central bankers (and policymakers in general) in assessing the 
need  for a short-run stabilization action: 1) lags in the availability of data and 2) 
measurement error in preliminary data.  In the United States major economic statistics are 
available at either monthly or quarterly frequency, usually with a initial publication lag of 
a month or two.  In other countries, comparable data may be measured at lower frequency 
and with longer publication lags.  Consequently, most formal statistical data that are 
available for policy deliberations are “stale.”  In the FOMC process, such data are 
supplemented by anecdotal data from the various Federal Reserve Districts.
52  The latter 
                                                 
52 See, for example, W. Poole (2002), “The Role of Anecdotal Information in Fed Policymaking,” 
<http://stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/2002/02_13_02.html> 
  29data are not collected from scientific surveys and the number of respondents surveyed is 
small.  Hence, there is a danger of inappropriately extrapolating from the small 
environment to the macroeconomy.  Nevertheless, such reports can give insights into and 
reduce, though not eliminate, uncertainty about emerging trends. 
  The second problem, measurement error, is well known; but until recently, it did 
not receive much attention, probably because it is regarded as a mundane problem and 
research into it is unlikely to receive much attention.  In appears that, recently, attitudes 
have been changing.  Research using “real-time data” has become more fashionable.  
Some of this research (Orphandides, 2001, 2002) alleges that the principal culprit in the 
“Great Inflation” in the United States was systematic bias in the real-time assessment of  
“potential output” and the “output gap” in FOMC deliberations.  Nevertheless, formal 
consideration of measurement error in forecasting models, whether constructed by private 
sector entities or by the staff of policy agencies, remains underdeveloped, even though 
the econometric methodology is well understood. The paucity of readily accessible 
vintage data may contribute to this problem.
53
  The second issue is the limited accuracy in the forecasts or projections that are 
available to monetary policymakers.  Absent instantaneous reaction of the economy to 
policy actions, effect stabilization actions require an assessment of the future state of the 
economy.  Gavin and Mandal (2001) found the accuracy of the forecasts by FOMC 
participants as recorded in Monetary Policy Reports from 1983 through 1994 for real 
                                                 
53 For the United States a limited amount of vintage data has been reconstructed by the research staff of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  Complete archives of the FRED data base have been preserved 
since the web version of this service was introduced in 1996 at least at monthly intervals; since 1999 at 
weekly intervals.  In the near future a new data service (Archival  FRED – AlFRED) will be implemented 
by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  Initially this service will allow the user 
to retrieve a data list that is indexed with an “as of” vintage date.  Over time, vintage data that was 
preserved on hard copy of National Economic Trends and Monetary Trends will be added to this archive. 
  30output growth were comparable those of private forecasters (e.g., Blue Chip 
forecasters).
54  However, the root-mean-squared forecast error at 12- and 18- month 
horizons was roughly 1 percent (at annualized rates.)  At a 6-month horizon the forecast 
error was ¾ of a percent.  In a subsequent analysis they extended the sample of forecasts 
to 1979 – 2001 (Gavin and Mandal, 2002).  For this longer sample, they found that the 
root-mean-squared forecast error at the 12- and 18- month horizons was 1.32 and 1.59 
percent, respectively. The same statistic at a 6-month forecast horizon was only slightly 
less than 1 percent.
55  This forecast (in)accuracy suggests that variations in real output 
growth, from recessions to rapid expansions, cannot be reliably distinguished on a 
horizon as short as a year.    
  The projection accuracy for real output of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(RBNZ) appears to be comparable to that of the participants in the FOMC.
56  Root-mean-
squared projection errors of the RBNZ are reported as 1 percent at a 1-quarter horizon 
and 1.5 percent at a 1-year horizon.   
  The Bank of England publishes estimates of the “uncertainty associated with its 
numeric projections of inflation and GDP growth with each of its Inflation Reports.
57  At 
the 1-year projection horizon conditioned on market interest rate expectations, the 
reported uncertainty measure is 0.76 percent; at the 2-year horizon it is 1.0 percent and at 
the 3-year horizon it is 1.10 percent.  These values are on the order of 50 percent of the 
root-mean-squared error of the RBNZ and FOMC projections at comparable horizons, 
                                                 
54 Gavin and Mandal (2001), Table 2.  Forecasts are fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter growth rates. 
55 Gavin and Mandal (2002), Table 1.  Forecasts are fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter growth rates. 
56 See Reserve Bank of New Zealand, “The Projection process and accuracy of the RBNZ projections,”  
< http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/review/0096577.html> 
57 The most recent estimates are in the “Numerical Parameters of Inflation Report Probability Distributions, 
February 2005,”< http://www.bankofengland.co.us/inflationreport/irprobab.htm>.   That report indicates 
  31but still suggest substantial uncertainty relative to business cycle fluctuations in real 
GDP. Other inflation targeting central banks also make public projections of real output 
growth, though this information does not appear to have a long history and we have not 
found any other analyses of these projection performances.
58  
  The final problem is the paucity of accurate information about the dynamic effects 
of policy actions. The major problem is that received macroeconomic theories generally 
provide little insight into dynamic structures.  This is reflected in the VAR paradigm that 
eschews any restrictions on dynamics. 
   One perspective is associated with Milton Friedman that lags in the impact of 
monetary policy are “long and variable.”  Another perspective is derived from impulse 
response functions of econometric models, including VAR specifications.  In many such 
models the impact effect of a shock to the monetary policy variable is constrained to be 
zero as part of the identifying restrictions imposed on the data.  In such models a typical 
response pattern is that several quarters elapse before a significant response of real output 
builds up, and then this response dissipates over a year to eighteen months.
59 In general, 
estimated confidence intervals around the impulse response functions are quite wide.  
This leaves a policymaker interested in short-run stabilization with a difficult and  
unfortunate dilemma: the impact of a policy action at any horizon is highly uncertain, and 
the horizon over which any policy action is most likely to have a major impact is one 
where the future is not predicted with any precision.  
                                                                                                                                                 
that the uncertainty measure is the standard deviation of the forecast error in those cases where the 
distribution of forecast errors is symmetric. 
58 We have found quantitative projections/forecasts of real output in published inflation/monetary reports of 
the central banks of Chile, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom  Undoubtedly we have missed some reports and we have not completed a tabulation of all 
published estimates. 
  32Conclusion  
  Several conclusions seem warranted.  First, inflation targeting central banks 
appear to have an admirable record of consistently hitting targets on a “medium run” 
horizon. However, it is not clear what the marginal contribution of inflation targeting 
beyond a credible commitment to price stability is, since the Federal Reserve, which 
eschews an inflation targeting framework, has accumulated a comparable record of low 
and stable inflation. 
  Second, it is not clear what will happen to low and stable inflation if  “bad 
shocks” are realized and the “going gets tough.”  “Good luck” in the form of a decade or 
two of relatively mild “shocks” cannot be ruled out as a significant environmental factor 
during the inflation targeting period (see Stock and Watson, 2003, pp. 46-47.) 
  Finally, the case for consistently effective short-run monetary stabilization 
policies is problematic – there are just too many dimensions to uncertainty in the 
environment in which central banks operate. 
                                                                                                                                                 
59 Impulse response functions that are typical of those derived from VAR analysis can be found in 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) Figures 2 and 4. 
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Table 1. Inflation Targeting Countries by Year of Adoption 
Year   Country  Total 
















1995 ------ 0 
1996 ------ 0 
1997 ------ 0 


















2002 Philippines  1 
1 Finland and Spain are considered to have become non-inflation-targeting countries 
upon joining the third stage of the EMU in 1999; this applies to Greece as of 2001.  
Sources:  
Authors’ compilation based on Monetary Policy and Inflation Reports of each country’s 
central bank and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), and Morande (2002). 
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Australia Headline  CPI  2%-3%  2%-3% 
Treasury underlying 

















Brazil  Headline CPI  4.5 % ± 
2.5% 
1999: 8% ± 2% 
2000: 6% ± 2% 
2001: 4% ± 2% 
2002: 3.5% ± 2%. 
2003: 4% ± 2.5%
61
2004: 4.5% ± 2.5% 
 





Canada  CPI and Core 
CPI
62  
2% ± 1% 
 













No Yes.  Monetary 
Policy Report 
                                                 
60 Source: Australia’s Central Bank. While the first formal agreement on the conduct of monetary policy between the RBA and the government was made in 
1996, the RBA effectively adopted inflation targeting in 1993. 
61 Bank of Brazil Open Letter 2002, 2003, 2004. http://www.bcb.gov.br/ingles/relinf/OpenLetter2003.pdf. 
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Chile Headline   
CPI 

























2005: 4.5% - 5.5% 








                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
62 Canada’s Core CPI excludes food, energy, and the effect of indirect taxes. 
 










1%-3% Net  Inflation 
1998: 5.5% - 6.5 % 
1999: 4%-5% 
2000: 3.5% - 5.5. % 
2001: 2%-4% 
Headline CPI 
2002 –2005:  
Band starts Jan. 
2002: 3%-5%. 




January 1998  Central Bank  Yes  Yes 
Finland
65 Core CPI  NA  Since 1993: 2%  February 
1993 to June 
1998 
 
Central Bank  No  No 
Hungary  CPI  4% ± 1%  2001: 7.5% ± 1% 
2002: 4.5% ± 1% 
2003: 3.5 % ± 1% 
2004: 3.5 % ± 1% 
2005: 4% ± 1% 




July 2001  Central Bank  Yes  Yes 
                                                 
63 Net inflation is calculated by the Czech Statistical Office (CSO) as the growth of prices in the unregulated part of the consumer basket adjusted for changes in 
indirect taxes and for abolition of subsidies. 
64 The inflation target 3% has been announced for the period from Jan. 2006 until the Czech Republic’s accession to the euro area. 
65 Since 1998, Finland has been a member of the ESCB and the Eurosystem. 
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Iceland CPI  2½%  ± 
1½% 
Since 2001: 2½% ± 
1½% 
 























2000: 3%-4 % 
2001: 3%- 4% 





Central Bank  Yes  Yes 
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1998: 9 ± 1% 
1999: 3 ± 1% 
2000: 2.5 ± 1% 
2001: 2.5 ± 1% 
2002: 3 ± 1% 
2003: 3 ± 1% 
Jan-2004, change to 
medium-term 
(instead of annual) 









Mexico  Headline CPI  3% ± 1%  1999: 13% 
2000: <10% 
2001: 6.5% 
2002: 4.5 % 
2003: 3% ± 1% (in 
line with trading 
partners) 






1%-3% 1990:  3%-5% 
1991: 2.5%-4.5% 



















Government Yes  Yes 
                                                 
66 Officially CPI, but RBNZ targets "underlying" or "core" inflation.CPI: (since Dec-97, the CPI excluding credit services; before that date, overall CPI. In late 
1999, mortgage interest rates were removed from the index) 
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2002: 2.5 ± 1% 
2003: 2.5 ± 1% 
2004: 2.5 ± 1% 
 
 























Poland  Headline CPI  2.5%± 1%  1998: <9.5% 
1999: 6.6-7.8% 
2000: 5.4-6.8% 
2001:<6-8%.  3% by 
2003 
2002: 5% ± 1%  
<4% by 2003 
2003: 3% ± 1% 
2004: 2.5% ± 1% 
 
 
October 1998  Central Bank  Yes  Yes 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
67 CPI inflation adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products 


























Sweden  Headline CPI  2%± 1%  Since 1995: 2% ± 
1% 
January 1993  Central Bank 
 
Yes Yes 
Switzerland  Headline CPI  Less than 
2% 
Since 2000: Less 
than 2% 












                                                 
68 The consumer price index for metropolitan and other urban areas excluding the interest cost of mortgage bonds. 
69 Since 1998, Spain is a member of the ESCB and the Eurosystem. 
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Thailand Core  CPI 
(Excludes 
raw food and 
energy 
prices) 
0% - 3.5%  Since 2000: 0%-
3.5% 










2%  1992: RPIX inflation 
1-4%   
1995: “2.5% or less” 
1997: 2.5% 
12/2003: CPI 
inflation 2% ± 1% 
 
October 1992  Government  Yes  Yes 
Sources: 
Authors’ compilations based on each central banks’ website discussions on Monetary Policy; individual monetary policy and inflation reports of each country; Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) and Morande (2002). 
 
 
                                                 
70Since 12/2003 CPI Inflation became the target, formerly known as the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices. Prior to that, RPIX inflation was targeted. 
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First Date for 
which Target 














Australia  2 - 3  Jun-2000  17 2.51  0.02
Brazil  4.5 ± 2.5  Dec-2003  12 8.80  1.72
Canada  2 ± 1  Nov-1992  109 2.24  0.24
Chile  2 - 4  Nov-2003  13 1.76  -1.24
Colombia  5 - 6  Dec-2002  24 6.17  1.34
Czech 
Republic 
1 - 3  Feb-2002  34 1.93  -0.07
Hungary  3.5 ± 1  Dec-2003  12 5.75  2.25
Iceland  2.5 ± 1.5  Aug-2003 (next 
date is April 
2001) 
16 3.37 0.58
Israel  1 - 3  Nov-2003  13 -0.35  -2.35





Mexico  2 - 4  December 2003  12 4.69  1.69
New Zealand  1 - 3  Never
71 59 2.15 0.15
Norway
72 2.5 Never  45 0.85  ---
Peru  2.5 ± 1  Nov-2003  13 3.03  0.53
Philippines  4 - 5  Dec-2003  12 6.38  3.76
Poland  2.5 ± 1.5  Dec-2003  12 3.09  0.39
South 
Africa 
3 - 6  Feb-2002  34 4.25  -0.17
Sweden  2 ± 1  Dec-2003  12 0.78  -1.22
Switzerland  Less than 2  Never
73 59 0.97 -0.03
Thailand  0 – 3.5  Never
74 55 0.30 -0.83
U.K.  2 ± 1  Never
75 146 1.46
76 -0.54
                                                 
71 Average rate of Inflation for New Zealand never went outside the range since inflation targeting regime 
was adopted (1990).   
72 No index numbers for CPI-ATE are available. Average rate of Headline CPI inflation was used instead. 
Value for average rate of Headline CPI inflation never exceeded 2.5 since inflation targeting regime was 
adopted (2001). 
73 Average rate of inflation for Switzerland never went outside the range since inflation targeting regime 
was adopted (2000). First date for which the average rate of inflation was outside the range was Oct-89 at 
2.09. 
74 Average rate of inflation for Thailand never went outside the range since inflation targeting regime was 
adopted (2000). First date for which the average rate of inflation was outside the range was Aug-92 at 3.52.   
75 First date for which the average rate of inflation was outside the range was Mar-92 at 3.03 for average 
rate of RPIX inflation. 
76 Note that in 12/2002, UK targeted RPIX, and not Headline CPI. The value for the average rate of 
inflation of RPIX in 12/2002 was 2.6, still within the target range as of 12/2004. 
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1988 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002
Inflation (Percent)Figure 2a. Australia: Moving Average of Inflation










1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Quarterly Treasury Underlying Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia
The initial, formal inflation target related to the Treasury Underlying measure of the CPI. When interest charges were removed from the CPI in the 
June quarter 1998, this target was amended to the headline CPI inflation rate.Figure 2b. Australia: Moving Average of Inflation













1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Quarterly Headline CPI Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia
The initial, formal inflation target related to the Treasury Underlying measure of the CPI. When interest charges were removed from the CPI in the 
June quarter 1998, this target was amended to the headline CPI inflation rate.Figure 3. Brazil: Moving Average of Inflation 













1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation











2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Inflation (Percent)Figure 4. Canada: Moving Average of Inflation 
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Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Banque du CanadaFigure 5. Chile: Moving Average of Inflation
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Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Target Midpoint Leading Moving Average of Inflation







2000 2002 2004Figure 6. Colombia: Moving Average of Inflation
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Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Target Midpoint Leading Moving Average of Inflation









2000 2002 2004Figure 7. Czech Republic: Moving Average of Inflation 
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Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Czech Statistical Office










2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Figure 8. Hungary: Moving Average of Inflation
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Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation










2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005Figure 9. Iceland: Moving Average of Inflation 









1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Statistics IcelandFigure 10. Israel: Moving Average of Inflation 








1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Target Midpoint Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, IsraelFigure 11a. Korea: Moving Average of Inflation 












1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation
Target Midpoint Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Korea National Statistics Office and The Bank of Korea.
Total CPI was targeted until 1999. Core Inflation was targeted beginning in 2000.Figure 11b. Korea: Moving Average of Inflation 










1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Core CPI Inflation Target Midpoint Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Korea National Statistics Office and The Bank of Korea.
Total CPI was targeted until 1999. Core Inflation was targeted beginning in 2000.Figure 12. Mexico: Moving Average of Inflation 
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Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Target Midpoint Leading Moving Average of Inflation







2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Figure 13a. New Zealand: Moving Average of Inflation 
and Inflation Target Range











1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly CPI ex. Credit Services Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
RBNZ targeted Underlying inflation until the September 1997 quarter, CPIX inflation through to the June 1999 quarter, then CPI 
inflation from the September 1999 quarter.Figure 13b. New Zealand: Moving Average of Inflation 









1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
RBNZ targeted Underlying inflation until the September 1997 quarter, CPIX inflation through to the June 1999 quarter, then CPI 
inflation from the September 1999 quarter.Figure 14. Norway: Moving Average of Inflation 
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Inflation (Percent)
Total CPI Inflation Target Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Statistics NorwayFigure 15. Peru: Moving Average of Inflation 
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Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation







2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Figure 16. Philippines: Moving Average of Inflation
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Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Target Midpoint Leading Moving Average of Inflation








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005Figure 17. Poland: Moving Average of Inflation 
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Inflation Target Range Monthly CPI Inflation Midpoint Leading Moving Average of Inflation









2000 2002 2004Figure 18. South Africa: Moving Average of Inflation 
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Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly CPIX Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: South African Reserve BankFigure 19. Sweden: Moving Average of Inflation 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Figure 20. Switzerland: Moving Average of Inflation
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Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: Swiss National BankFigure 21. Thailand: Moving Average of Inflation 
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Inflation (Percent)
Inflation Target Range Monthly Core CPI Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source : Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices, Ministry of Commerce, ThailandFigure 22a. United Kingdom: Moving Average of Inflation 
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RPIX Inflation Target Range RPIX Lower Bound Monthly RPIX Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: National Statistics, UK













2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Figure 22b. United Kingdom: Moving Average of Inflation 
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CPI Inflation Target Range Monthly Total CPI Inflation Leading Moving Average of Inflation
Source: National Statistics, UK
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